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Exportsa b s t r a c t
Does corporate ﬁnancial structure matter for a ﬁrm’s ability to compete in international markets through
output quality? This study answers this question by using ﬁrm-level export and balance sheet data cov-
ering a large sample of French manufacturing exporters over the period 1997–2007. The main result is
that there is a negative causal relation between a ﬁrm’s leverage and export quality, where quality is
inferred from the estimation of a discrete choice model of foreign consumers’ demand. This result is
robust across different speciﬁcations and estimation techniques. In addition, by estimating investment
models we ﬁnd that the negative impact of leverage on quality is consistent with theories predicting that
the agency cost of debt determines suboptimal investment.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Departing from the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, a
number of empirical studies questions the irrelevance of corporate
ﬁnancial structure for real activities by showing that leverage, as a
measure of debt ﬁnancing, affects investment patterns and produc-
tivity growth (e.g., Lang et al., 1996; Ahn et al., 2006; Coricelli et al.,
2012). Contributions to the international trade literature show that
a ﬁrm’s export activity depends on ﬁnancial factors, and several
papers suggest that exporters are less leveraged and more liquid
than non-exporters (e.g., Bellone et al., 2010; Minetti and Zhu,
2011).
The present study provides new elements to understand the
relation between a company’s ﬁnancial structure and export per-
formance by investigating whether leverage affects a ﬁrm’s ability
to compete in foreign markets through output quality. This
research question is relevant from a policy perspective. On theone hand, the promotion of quality as a dimension of international
competitiveness is an objective of high-income economies facing
price competition from low-wage countries. On the other hand,
because corporate ﬁnancial structure is sensitive to policy param-
eters, the debt-quality nexus should be considered when evaluat-
ing the implications of policies that may affect a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
structure. For example, the relation between debt ﬁnancing and
output quality can be a channel through which corporate tax
reforms affect exporters’ performance, if their level of debt respond
to changes in proﬁt taxation.
A possible link between ﬁnancial leverage and output quality
emerges by observing that debt ﬁnancing redirects investment
toward short-term projects (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991;
Peyer and Shivdasani, 2001), while quality upgrading requires
upfront investment delivering higher returns in the long-term
(Shapiro, 1983). In addition, upgrading output quality requires
ﬁrm-speciﬁc activities such as market research and R&D that gen-
erate few collateralizable assets. Hence, these activities are more
difﬁcult to monitor by bondholders, who may therefore require a
higher premium on the cost of debt to bear the risk of default
and moral hazard (Long and Malitz, 1985). Hence, ceteris paribus
ﬁrms with high levels of debt should ﬁnd it more costly and have
less incentive to invest in quality upgrading. By signaling higher
risk of bankruptcy, high leverage may also discourage a ﬁrm’s
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compromise the expectations of its customers on the provision of
post-sale services (Titman, 1984; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). It is
then possible that these channels further reduce the perceived or
real quality of a highly leveraged ﬁrm’s products.
However, the intense use of debt ﬁnancing may also result from
a proﬁt optimizing choice of the company or from the strategic use
of ﬁnancial leverage to acquire advantages over the competitors
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Brander
and Lewis, 1986). In these cases, we expect high leverage to be cho-
sen also by ﬁrms with sufﬁcient internal liquidity because the neg-
ative effect of leverage on quality is offset by its positive effects on
efﬁciency and market position. On the basis of these theoretical
premises, we formulate three hypotheses on the impact of debt
on export quality. First, more leveraged ﬁrms export lower quality
varieties within narrowly deﬁned product categories. Second, the
effect of leverage on quality is stronger for illiquid exporters that
have less ability to substitute internal funds for debt. Third, the
negative impact of leverage is stronger in less concentrated indus-
tries with less scope for strategic interactions among competitors.
These hypotheses are investigated by using a rich dataset com-
bining ﬂow-level export data with ﬁrm-level balance sheet data on
French companies. This dataset covers a large sample of exporters
over the period 1997–2007, and it allows to conduct panel analyses
both at the level of the individual export ﬂow (i.e.,
ﬁrm-product-destination) and at the level of individual exporters.
Because leverage is expected to impact output quality through
investment, this premise is tested by estimating an investment
equation augmented with an indicator of ﬁnancial leverage. The
relation between leverage and export quality is then investigated
by estimating a model where the dependent variable is either a
ﬁrm-level or a ﬂow-level proxy for export quality. This proxy is
obtained from the estimation of a discrete choice model of foreign
consumer demand that exploits information on market shares and
prices to infer the relative quality of each exported variety vis-a-vis
the varieties exported by other ﬁrms targeting the same export
destination within the same product category (Berry, 1994;
Khandelwal, 2010). A negative correlation between quality and
leverage is ﬁrst obtained from an OLS model exploiting quality
variations across varieties of the same product exported to a single
market by companies with different levels of debt. A causal claim
on this relation is supported by the use of a Two Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) and Instrumental Variable Fixed Effect models
introducing external instruments to address the endogeneity of
leverage in regressions on quality, while controlling for ﬁrm-level
unobserved heterogeneity and industry-level factors.
Our paper relates closely to the ﬁnancial literature that investi-
gates the nexus between a ﬁrm’s capital structure and the product
market. In the model of Brander and Lewis (1986) ﬁnancial lever-
age is used by Cournot oligopolists to commit to higher levels of
output at the expense of the competitors. While there is some evi-
dence that industry concentration leads to higher levels of leverage
and to the strategic use of debt among competitors (MacKay and
Phillips, 2005), there is no clear empirical support for a positive
relationship between leverage, investment and market perfor-
mance (e.g., Campello, 2003, 2006). A recent extension of the orig-
inal model of Brander and Lewis rationalizes this conﬂicting
evidence, by showing that the limited liability of debt may also
decrease a ﬁrm’s incentive to invest when a ﬁrm’s investment deci-
sion is introduced explicitly in the theoretical setup (Clayton,
2009).
By investigating the impact of a ﬁrm’s level of debt on its export
quality our contribution to the ﬁnancial literature is twofold. First,
we empirically identify a speciﬁc channel through which capital
structure affects a ﬁrm’s competitive position in foreign markets.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that investigates theimpact of leverage on quality for a large sample of companies from
different manufacturing industries. Second, our empirical setting is
favorable to address the ambiguous direction of causality between
a ﬁrm’s capital structure and the nature of the competitive envi-
ronment. If a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage responds strategically to
changes in the structure of the product market, it is expected to
respond more sensitively to changes in the domestic market
because this constitutes the single most important market for the
majority of ﬁrms. Because our measure of quality is based on for-
eign sales, we can convincingly control for cross-industry hetero-
geneity in market structure (i.e., with industry-level or ﬁrm-level
ﬁxed effects), changes in the concentration of the domestic market
(i.e., with time varying indices of market structure) while still
retaining sufﬁcient variation in the dependent variable to identify
the impact of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure on quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
introduces the conceptual framework underpinning the relation
between leverage and quality. Section 3 describes the dataset
and details the construction of the main variables. Section 4 illus-
trates the econometric speciﬁcations of the investment and the
quality equation and motivates the choice of estimation methods.
Section 5 describes the results and introduces robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.2. Leverage, investment and quality
The milestone result of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) that
a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial structure is irrelevant for investment depends
crucially on the Arrow–Debreu setting of complete markets with-
out information asymmetries, taxes, transaction or bankruptcy
costs. In contrast, Myers (1977) shows that debt ﬁnancing may
induce suboptimal investment in the presence of uncertain returns
and conﬂicting interests between creditors and stockholders.
Despite the distortive effect of debt on investment, the ‘pecking
order theory’ of capital structure suggests that this source of
ﬁnancing is used by companies with insufﬁcient internal funds
when information asymmetries between current and perspective
stockholders increase the cost of equity ﬁnancing above the cost
of debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Jointly taken these results sug-
gest that ﬁrms with greater dependence on debt are more subject
to underinvestment. To the extent that investment is required to
upgrade product quality, highly leveraged companies may be less
capable to adjust output quality to seize demand opportunities
arising from cross-sectional and longitudinal variations in con-
sumers’ preferences.
In addition, quality upgrading requires more intangible assets
than alternative projects. The model of Long and Malitz (1985)
shows that the agency cost of debt ﬁnancing is relatively higher
for investments in intangibles such as R&D and advertisement
because these assets cannot be pledged as collateral and it is more
difﬁcult for bondholders to monitor the use of resources.
Consistently with the predictions of their model, they observe that
US ﬁrms undertaking more advertising and R&D choose a less
leveraged ﬁnancial structure. This result is largely supported by
the empirical literature on R&D ﬁnancing that provides strong evi-
dence that this kind of investment is particularly sensitive to the
availability of internal resources (e.g., Hall, 2002).
An alternative story on the negative relation between leverage
and quality emphasizes the short-term bias determined by debt
ﬁnancing on a ﬁrm’s investment choice. In the presence of bank-
ruptcy costs, a highly leveraged company may prefer low-risk
investment opportunities that in the short-term generate sufﬁcient
cash-ﬂow for debt service. Along this line of argument, Maksimovic
and Titman (1991) present a model in which investment in pro-
duct quality develops ‘reputation capital’ that allows a ﬁrm to
6 In FICUS, ﬁrms with revenues below €81,500 (manufacturing) or €35,600
(services) are excluded. We also dropped ﬁrms with less than 10 employees. All
values reported in this dataset are in ’000 euros and they are deﬂated using 2-digit
industry speciﬁc indices provided by INSEE for consumer, value added and capital
prices.
7 Export data are collected monthly by the French Customs Ofﬁce, but we can only
access these information at the yearly frequency. Firms that over the same ﬁscal year
export less than €1,000 outside the EU, or less than €100,000 within the EU (raised to
€150,000 in 2006), are not required to report their transactions and they are
underrepresented in the Customs dataset. Some CN8 product categories are reclas-
siﬁed over the years and we use Eurostat tables to concord all product categories to
the 2007 classiﬁcation.
8 For example, in the CN8 classiﬁcation men’s shirts of man-made ﬁbre are
subdivided in shirts of synthetic ﬁbre (CN8: 61052010) and shirts of artiﬁcial ﬁbre
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probability of future bankruptcy, it shortens a ﬁrm’s optimization
horizon and reduces present investment in quality. In addition,
highly leveraged ﬁrms that face an immediate threat of bankruptcy
may reduce quality to cut costs and to sustain cash-ﬂows for debt
servicing. In the words of the authors, this strategy is equivalent to
‘‘obtaining an involuntary loan from consumers because the reduc-
tion in future revenue resulting from the loss of reputation corre-
sponds to the repayment’’ (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991,
p. 117). Supporting empirical evidence emerges from the US super-
market industry where more leveraged companies incur frequent
shortfalls in inventories (i.e., an industry speciﬁc proxy for ‘bad
quality’) to preserve cash-ﬂow for debt servicing (Matsa, 2011).
Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) exploit leveraged recapitalizations
to identify the impact of debt on a company’s allocation of invest-
ment across different business segments. After ﬁnding that lever-
aged recapitalizations redirect a ﬁrm’s investment toward
activities with higher current cash-ﬂow, they similarly conclude
that there is evidence of a short-term investment bias induced
by higher debt. Lastly, high leverage may worsen the quality of a
ﬁrm’s output when suppliers and customers base their expecta-
tions on a ﬁrm’s risk of bankruptcy on its level of debt (Titman,
1984; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). Indeed, customers requiring
post-sale service may evaluate of lower quality the product pro-
vided by a ﬁrm with greater risk of bankruptcy, and suppliers
may be less willing to make sunk investment to customize the
intermediate inputs sold to a highly leveraged ﬁrm, with negative
consequences for the quality of the ﬁnal good.
Differences in preferences, product standards and regulations
are important barriers to trade imposing upfront costs on ﬁrms
entering foreign markets. Because foreign sales are more uncertain
and difﬁcult to monitor by lenders, the agency cost of debt may be
higher when it comes to ﬁnancing foreign operations (Feenstra
et al., 2011). Empirically, ﬁnancial constraints have been found
preventing some ﬁrms from selecting into exporting and expand-
ing their foreign operations (Bellone et al., 2010; Minetti and
Zhu, 2011; Manova and Zhang, 2012; Amiti and Weinstein,
2011). Hence it might be expected that export activity exacerbates
the agency cost of debt when it comes to ﬁnance quality upgrading.
Drawing on these theoretical results and empirical evidence, we
formulate our ﬁrst working hypothesis:
Hyp 1: Exporters with high level of debt have a
cost-disadvantage or fewer incentives to invest in quality
upgrading projects. As a result, they export low quality
varieties.
However, the ‘trade-off theory’ of corporate ﬁnancial structure
suggests that, despite the agency cost of debt, a leveraged ﬁnancial
structure can also result from a value optimizing choice. For exam-
ple, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that if ownership and man-
agement are separated, and if perfect monitoring is impossible (or
costly), debt acts as a ‘disciplinary device’ on managers by limiting
free cash-ﬂow and unproﬁtable discretionary spending. Margaritis
and Psillaki (2010) provide some evidence consistent with this
hypothesis by ﬁnding that more efﬁcient ﬁrms choose higher levels
of leverage. In addition, because interest rate payments can be
deducted from taxable proﬁts, debt ‘shields’ proﬁts from taxation
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973). Unfortunately, in our dataset it is
not possible to identify ﬁrms for which high leverage characterizes
the optimal ﬁnancial structure.5 However, when a ﬁrm has greater
internal resources, it is more likely that high leverage stems from a5 The maturity structure of a ﬁrm’s debt is not observable in our dataset and we
cannot use it to identify the strategic use of debt.value optimizing choice rather than from a lack of alternative
sources of ﬁnancing. This observation leads to our second
hypothesis:
Hyp 2: For ﬁrms with greater internal liquidity, a leveraged
ﬁnancial structure is more likely to arise as a value opti-
mizing choice, and it should be less detrimental to pro-
duct quality.
On the basis of this hypothesis we should expect a ﬁrm’s liquid-
ity to moderate the impact of leverage on quality.
Finally, models of oligopolistic competition predict that higher
levels of debt ﬁnancing may serve as a commitment device to
induce competitors to produce lower levels of output (Brander
and Lewis, 1986), or to acquire bargaining power over workers
(Bronars and Deere, 1991) and suppliers (Perotti and Spier,
1993). On the basis of these theoretical results we should expect
leverage to have a more negative impact on output quality, when
this effect is not offset by the strategic advantage of setting high
levels of debt. The degree of market concentration is then likely
to interact with the level of leverage which results from the
ﬁrm’s value optimizing choice. We then formulate our last
hypothesis:
Hyp 3: The negative effect of leverage on ﬁrm export quality is
stronger in more competitive industries, where the strate-
gic use of the capital structure is not a viable option to
gain market shares or to reduce the costs of production.
3. Features of the data and of the main variables
The dataset used for this study is assembled from two main
administrative sources. The Fichier complet de Système Uniﬁé de
Statistique d’Entreprises (FICUS) provided by the French National
Statistical Ofﬁce (INSEE) reports balance sheet information for
almost the entire population of French ﬁrms observed over the per-
iod 1997–2007.6 In this dataset we retain only manufacturing com-
panies whose export activity is documented in the French Customs
Dataset during the same period of time. Indeed, a unique ﬁscal iden-
tiﬁer (SIREN code) allows us to associate each exporter in FICUS with
its own export ﬂows in the Customs dataset. This second database
reports quantities (kilograms), free-on-board values (euros) and
countries of destination for each ﬁrm-level export ﬂow disaggre-
gated at the 8-digit product category of the Combined
Nomenclature (CN8).7 In order to reduce the number of ﬂow-level
export series discontinued over time, 8-digit product categories are
collapsed at the 6-digit level by aggregating quantities and values
exported by the same ﬁrm within a destination in a given year.8(CN8: 61052090). We sum quantities and values exported by the same company to
the same destination within these two product categories to obtain a unique export
ﬂow for men’s shirts of man-made ﬁbre (CN6: 610520). The resulting 6-digit code is
consistent with the harmonized standard nomenclature (HS6) that is the classiﬁca-
tion used by most studies on trade.
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of bonds, loans and other form of debt to credit institutions, plus
deposits and funds of employee participation. Notice that payables
to tax authorities and social security administration are excluded
from the computation. A limitation of the dataset is that it does
not include information on the maturity of debt. An indicator of
a ﬁrm’s f leverage at time t is constructed as
lev ft ¼ debtft=ðdebtft þ equityft þ tradeftÞ where equityft is the nomi-
nal value of a company’s shares, and tradeft is the total amount
owed by the ﬁrm to its suppliers.9 An alternative indicator is
obtained as the ratio of a ﬁrm’s debt over total assets
lev2ft ¼ debtft=assetft . This will be used in robustness tests. We use
the perpetual inventory method to obtain a measure of the replace-
ment value of the capital stock (K). In the ﬁrst year that a company is
observed, the historic cost and the replacement cost of capital are
assumed to be equal, and capital is measured as the book value of
a ﬁrm’s tangible assets. In later periods the replacement value of
capital is computed as: Kf ðtþ1Þ ¼ Kft  ð1 dÞ  ðptþ1=ptÞ þ Ift where
d is the economic depreciation rate of capital set at 5.5%, ptþ1=pt is
the ratio of the industry speciﬁc price deﬂators for capital goods in
two consecutive periods, and I is the investment of the ﬁrm.10
Cash-ﬂow CF, computed as the sum of after-tax proﬁts and
depreciation, approximates a ﬁrm’s ability to generate internal
resources from sales. Following Guariglia (2008), CF is used to con-
struct three dummy variables: NGCFft ¼ 1 when the ratio of CFft
over total sales is negative,MDCFft ¼ 1 when the same ratio is pos-
itive but below the 75th percentile computed at the 2-digit
industry-year level, and HICFft ¼ 1 when it is above the 75th per-
centile. These three indicators identify ﬁrm-years observations
characterized by insufﬁcient, normal or abundant internal
resources for self-ﬁnancing investment. Variations in demand are
captured by Dsft; that is the log difference between a ﬁrm’s sales
at time t and at time t  1.
Because the literature suggests that there is a positive relation
between export quality and productivity (Verhoogen, 2012),
regressions on quality include a control for a ﬁrm’s total factor pro-
ductivity tfpft . This is obtained as the residual of the production
function on log value-added according to the method of
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).11 Further controls introduced in
regressions on quality are: a ﬁrm’s capital intensity kapintft mea-
sured as the log of the value of tangible assets per employee, labor
input lab measured as the number of permanent employees multi-
plied by the yearly average number of hours worked per employee
in the industry, export intensity expintft obtained as the ratio of for-
eign sales over total sales, the log and the log squared of a ﬁrm’s age
ageft and age2ft , and the dummy variables groupft and foreignft
respectively taking value one when a ﬁrm belongs to a domestic or
a foreign business group and zero otherwise.
In addition to ﬁrm-level factors, industry-level and
country-level factors are relevant determinants of a ﬁrm’s capital
structure (e.g., Jong et al., 2008). Because the empirical analysis
is conducted on French ﬁrms only, it is possible to ignore the role
of institutional factors determining most of the variation in capital
structure across countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
On the contrary, it is still necessary to control for industry-level
factors that may correlate both with the regressor of interest,
leverage, and with the dependent variable measuring quality.129 The measure of leverage adopted in our study is identical to the one computed by
Bertrand et al. (2007), who use similar administrative French data.
10 The economic depreciation rate of capital is set at 5.5% as in Guariglia (2008). In
an unreported robustness check, all results hold when we change this parameter to
8% as in Bond et al. (2010).
11 The production function is estimated separately for each 2-digit ISIC industry.
12 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to control for
industry-speciﬁc factors.Hence, industry-level heterogeneity is controlled for by introducing
industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects in all the speciﬁcations that do not
already control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects. We also control for a
set of time-varying industry-speciﬁc factors such as market concen-
tration in a ﬁrm’s own industry HIst , and the average concentration
across the industries of its suppliers SupplierHIst and clients
ClientHIst . While HIst is computed as the Herﬁndahl index on the total
assets of French companies operating in the same 2-digit ISIC indus-
try of the ﬁrm, SupplierHIst and ClientHIst are weighted averages of
HIst computed across all industries supplying inputs and using the
output from s as an input.13 These controls are necessary in the light
of theoretical results and empirical evidence suggesting that a ﬁrm’s
optimal capital structure depends not only on the competitive envi-
ronment in which it operates but also on the market structure of its
suppliers and customers (Hennessy and Livdan, 2009; Chu, 2012).
Lastly, we control for differences in research and development
(R&D) intensity across industries, and across the industries of a
ﬁrm’s suppliers and customers by introducing in regressions the
industry-level time-varying controls RDst; SupplierRDst and
ClientRDst . RDst measures sectoral R&D intensity as R&D expendi-
ture on total output, SupplierRDst and ClientRDst are weighted aver-
ages of R&D intensity across the industries of a ﬁrm’s suppliers and
clients.14 These variables control for differences in innovative inten-
sity across industries that may affect both product quality and debt
levels. Indeed, Kale and Shahrur (2007) ﬁnd that by discouraging
suppliers’ and consumers’ relationship-speciﬁc investment high debt
levels hamper more seriously the performance of ﬁrms operating in
R&D intensive industries.
3.1. Estimation of export quality
The working deﬁnition of ‘quality’ adopted in this study refers
to the set of a product characteristics that increase a consumer’s
utility. According to this deﬁnition, a ﬁrm’s ability to compete
through quality entails its capacity to identify consumers’ prefer-
ences and to translate them into desirable product characteristics.
Because consumers’ preferences vary over time and across foreign
markets, a country-speciﬁc and time-varying measure of export
quality is obtained by estimating a discrete choice model of con-
sumer demand. This model, popular in the Industrial
Organization literature, has been recently applied to trade data
by Khandelwal (2010) to estimate the quality of different import
ﬂows to the US. Our empirical approach follows closely
Khandelwal (2010) even thus we use data on ﬁrm-level export
ﬂows instead of data on bilateral trade ﬂows between countries.
The simple intuition behind this approach is to infer quality as
the share of an exported variety over a country’s total import in a
given product category that is not explained by the price. Under
the assumption that individual consumers make a discrete choice
among different varieties of the same product, the share of one
variety over the total quantity consumed within a product class
can be seen as the empirical counterpart of a consumer’s probabil-
ity of choosing one variety over the others. A logit model expresses
this probability as a function of a variety’s price, observable and
unobservable characteristics and consumers’ random taste param-
eters. This model can be conveniently expressed in a linear form:15
lnðsiÞ  lnðsoÞ ¼ X0ibþ api þ rlnðsi=gÞ þ Qi ð1Þ13 The weights are based on the OECD STAN input–output table for France. When
computing SupplierHIst weights are calculated as the shares of total input of industry s
obtained from each other industry. When computing ClientHIst weights are calculated
as the shares of output sold by industry s to each other industry.
14 The measure of R&D intensity is obtained from OECD STAN INDICATORS. Weights
from input–output tables are used to compute suppliers’ and customers’ R&D
intensity.
15 The derivation of Eq. (1) is detailed in the Appendix A.
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variety i in a particular product class normalized subtracting the
log share of an ‘outside variety’ lnðsoÞ.16 This normalized share
depends on a variety’s price pi, ‘horizontal’ characteristics X
0 and
quality Qi. The vector of parameters b captures consumers’ prefer-
ences for different product attributes and a is the disutility of price.
The term lnðsi=gÞ is the ‘nest share’ of variety i, namely the quantity
share of variety i over a more disaggregated product category than
the one used to construct shares on the left-hand side of the model.17
This term allows a product market to be segmented in subclasses g
including varieties that are closer substitutes.
From an empirical perspective, the export price pi of a variety
(deﬁned at the HS6 product-ﬁrm-destination level) can be repre-
sented by its unit-value, obtained dividing the value of the ﬂow
by its quantity.18 The share of a variety within an export destination
di is computed as the quantity of the variety over the total quantity
imported by a destination in that year within a 4-digit HS product
category. The share of the outside variety so is measured as the share
of a country’s imports within each 4-digit product class that is not
originated from France. After normalization, the demand for the
variety exported by a French company to a destination country is
expressed in relation to a benchmark ‘generic variety’ obtained by
pooling the imports from all other countries to the same destination.
Because the objective is to identify the heterogeneity in the quality
of the varieties exported by French ﬁrms, the choice of the outside
variety does not affect our analysis. The nest-share si=g is computed
as the quantity share of the same variety over the total import of
the country within the more disaggregated 6-digit product
category.19
Eq. (1) is estimated separately for each of the 1217 4-digit pro-
duct classes observed in the dataset to accommodate variations in
the parameters a and r across products. Demand equations are
both estimated by Fixed-Effect models (FE) with the panel unit
set at the HS6 product-destination level, and by Two Stage Least
Squares Fixed-Effect models (IVFE) where in addition to controlling
for product-destination ﬁxed effects, external instruments are used
to address the endogeneity of prices and nest-shares that correlate
with the unobservable quality term subsumed in the error.
Endogeneity is suspected to bias upward the parameter a: if price
increases in unobserved quality, and quality affects positively mar-
ket shares, omitted-variable bias leads to underestimate the nega-
tive impact of prices on demand. We use the average price of
French exporters computed at the year-HS6 product-destination16 The ‘outside variety’ indexed by o is a variety excluded from the estimation
sample for which we observe the market share. The ‘outside variety’ is a variety
whose price and quality are uncorrelated with the price and quality of the varieties
included in the estimation sample (Nevo, 2000). By subtracting the log share of the
‘outside variety’ so to the log share of each variety included in the estimation sample
si we obtain normalized quantity shares mirroring the relative probability that a
consumer in a given market chooses one unit of variety i over one unit of variety o.
Without loss of generality, the utility derived from consuming one unit of o is
normalized at 0. This normalization greatly simpliﬁes the dimensionality problem in
the estimation of the demand function.
17 For example, si on the left-hand side of the model is the share of men’s shirts of
man-made ﬁbre exported by the French ﬁrm f to Italy in 2000 (HS6:610520) over the
total quantity of men’s shirts of all materials imported by Italy in the same year
(HS6:6105), while si=g on the right-hand side is the share of men’s shirts of man-made
ﬁbre exported by the French ﬁrm f to Italy in 2000 (HS6:610520) over Italy’s total
imports of men’s shirts of man-made ﬁbre in that same year (HS6:610520).
18 The unit-value is the best proxy for a variety’s price that can be computed from
Customs data (Bastos and Silva, 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012). However this proxy
is noisy due to measurement errors in export quantities and to product heterogeneity
within export classes. HS6 product classes are deﬁned at a ﬁne-grained level of
disaggregation, and we are mostly worried about measurement errors. For this
reason, we eliminate extreme observations by dropping unit-values that are below
the 1st and above the 99th percentile of the distribution within each product class.
19 Details on the use of trade data to construct the market shares are left in the
Appendix A.level to instrument for the price of individual varieties. This instru-
ment is correlated with the price of the individual varieties
because it varies over time due to common demand shocks affect-
ing all French exporters, but it is expected to be orthogonal with
respect to the quality of individual varieties that is the main cause
of endogeneity. The instrument for si=g is instead the number of
French exporters in a given HS6 product class targeting the same
export market in a given year. Again, the number of competitors
is expected to correlate with the ‘nest-share’ of each exporter but
to be independent with respect to individual exporters’ quality.
Customs data do not provide information on a variety’s character-
istics, making it impossible to disentangle the component of
demand explained by ‘horizontal’ product attributes in X0 that ﬁt
more closely the taste of some consumers (e.g., color), from the
component explained by ‘vertical’ attributes that all consumers
perceive as desirable (e.g., quality of the fabric). Instead, we mea-
sure a broader concept of quality Q i , that is the closeness of a vari-
ety to consumers’ tastes, that an exporter achieves by combining
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ attributes:
Q i ¼ ½lnðsiÞ  lnðsoÞ  ½a^pi þ r^lnðsi=gÞ ð2Þ
Qi  X0ibþ Qi:
where Q i is the residual market share of a variety obtained as the
distance from the ﬁtted market share computed using the esti-
mated parameters a^ and r^. In some econometric speciﬁcations we
aggregate ﬂow-levels estimates of quality Q i to obtain a
ﬁrm-level indicator Q f that expresses the average relative quality




wi  ðQ i  Q pdÞ
where wi is the value share of ﬂow i over the total exports of ﬁrm f
in a given year, and Q pd is the average quality level within the same
HS6 product-destination cell of variety i.20
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 describes the panel structure of the ﬁnal dataset. This
includes only the HS4 product categories exported by manufactur-
ing ﬁrms for which we obtain signiﬁcant and credible estimates of
the demand parameters (i.e., a^ > 0 and 0 < r^ < 1).21 The reason for
eliminating HS4 product categories that do not conform with these
criteria is to retain in the sample only those observations for which
we obtain reliable estimates of quality. Only 490 of the initial 1217
HS4 categories are retained. Nevertheless these products account for
more than 75% of all ﬁrm-product-year observations. This cleaning
eliminates HS4 products that are exported mainly by
non-manufacturing companies, and those for which it is not possible
to identify precisely the parameters of the demand equation because
of insufﬁcient observations.
In Table 1, Panel A reports the number of unique export vari-
eties and unique ﬁrms observed each year. The number of expor-
ters ranges from a minimum of 18,591 in 2000 to a maximum of
24,320 in 1999. The number of unique export varieties
(ﬁrm-product-destination) ranges from a minimum of 324,759 in
2000 to a maximum of 546,399 in 1999. Large variations in these
ﬁgures arise because in some years a number of export ﬂows
misses the information on export quantities. Hence, it is not possi-
ble to estimate quality for these varieties, and they are dropped
from the sample. Panel B reports the number of unique varieties20 The time subscript is omitted to avoid cluttering the notation even if ﬂow- and
ﬁrm-level measures of quality vary over time.
21 Table 10 in the Appendix A reports summary statistics from the estimation of Eq.
(1) and shows the percentage of observations retained in the sample.
Table 1
Panel structure of the dataset.
Panel A Panel B
Year # Varieties i # Firms f # Periods # Varieties i # Firms f
1997 471,966 22,158 1 1,302,188 13,784
1998 500,374 23,352 2 373,353 7,333
1999 546,339 24,320 3 201,033 5,425
2000 324,759 18,591 4 116,108 4,173
2001 549,224 23,403 5 85,498 3,597
2002 547,947 23,964 6 59,101 2,917
2003 379,358 18,861 7 40,080 2,946
2004 398,106 18,560 8 41,270 4,151
2005 398,725 20,741 9 18,287 1,988
2006 394,784 20,052 10 13,729 2,282
2007 447,042 20,696 11 13,410 3,932
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number of varieties and ﬁrms appear in the dataset for one year
only. Because ﬁrms that exit the sample (i.e., stop exporting) are
generally smaller and more ﬁnancially constrained, over time the
panel overrepresents ﬁnancially sound companies with strong
export performance. This attrition bias works against ﬁnding evi-
dence of a negative impact of debt ﬁnancing on export quality,
because more ﬁnancially sound companies are conceivably less
affected by the issues discussed in Section 2.
Table 2 reports the mean and the standard deviation of the vari-
ables of interest computed within the whole sample (column 1),
and within sub-samples of ﬁrm-year observations with different
liquidity (columns 2–4) and leverage (columns 5–7). A negative
relation between leverage and investment is not apparent looking
at these statistics, as we ﬁnd that the investment ratio Ift=Kf ðt1Þ is
higher in the subs-ample of ﬁrm-year observations with high
leverage than in the sub-samples with medium and low leverage.
This relation can be explained by the fact that debt is used for
investment and that these simple statistics are insufﬁcient to cap-
ture the causal effect of the level of debt on current investment.
On average, ﬁrms with high levels of leverage are also charac-
terized by slower sale growth Ds, lower productivity tfp, fewer
HS6 product exported, and fewer export destinations served than
exporters with low or medium leverage. More importantly,
descriptive statistics already provide some evidence that high
leverage may be a determinant of low-quality exports. On average,
low-leverage exporters sell varieties that are more expensive and
with higher quality than high-leverage exporters competing on
the same product. In contrast, capital intensity kapint and export
intensity expint increase in the level of leverage.22
4. Empirical strategy
4.1. Investment model
This paper focuses on exporters, and a rich empirical literature
emphasizes how these companies self-select into international
activities due to their superior characteristics. For instance, previ-
ous studies found that exporters are less ﬁnancially constrained
than non-exporters (e.g., Bellone et al., 2010; Minetti and Zhu,
2011). Hence, it is necessary to test whether the negative relation
between leverage and investment, suggested by some of the stud-
ies discussed in Section 2, applies to exporters. To do so, we esti-
mate a static and a dynamic speciﬁcation of the following
investment model:22 For all variables mentioned in this section, t-tests indicate that differences in
means across sub-samples are signiﬁcant at conﬁdence levels lower than 1%.Ift=Kf ðt1Þ ¼ a0 þ a1If ðt1Þ=Kf ðt2Þ þ a2Dsft þ a3Dsf ðt1Þ
þ a4CFft=sft þ a5lev f ðt1Þ þ v f þ vs þ v t þ eft ð3Þ
where v f ;vs and v t are respectively ﬁrm-, industry- and
year-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, and eft is the idiosyncratic component
of the error term. In this model, ﬁrm-level investment opportunities
are proxied by contemporaneous and lagged variations in a ﬁrm’s
sales Dsft and Dsf ðt1Þ, while the availability of internal resources is
captured by the cash-ﬂow over current sales CFft=sft .
To mitigate endogeneity arising from reverse causation, on the
right-hand side we introduce leverage in its ﬁrst lag, instead of its
contemporaneous value. When we estimate a static speciﬁcation of
the model, we impose the restriction a1 ¼ 0 and exclude the lagged
dependent variable If ðt1Þ=Kf ðt2Þ from the right-hand side. Static
speciﬁcations are estimated by Random-Effect (RE) and
Fixed-Effect (FE) Panel model. RE models allow for serial correla-
tion in the errors within individual ﬁrms’ time series, but they gen-
erate consistent estimates only if the component v f of the error
term is not systematically correlated with the regressors. FE mod-
els instead relax this assumption and eliminate the ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects from the error by applying within-group transformation.
In these models, we identify the coefﬁcient on lev f ðt1Þ by exploit-
ing only variations in debt levels and investment within the time
series of individual ﬁrms. Even if the FE estimator addresses the
omitted variable bias caused by the correlation between the
regressors and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, endogeneity may still
arise because of time-varying unobserved factors (e.g., contingent
policies of the ﬁrm) affecting both lev f ðt1Þ and Ift=Kf ðt1Þ.
To address this issue we estimate a dynamic speciﬁcation of
Model (3) by relaxing the assumption that a1 ¼ 0, and by introduc-
ing the lagged dependent variable If ðt1Þ=Kf ðt2Þ as an additional
regressor. Following a popular approach in the investment litera-
ture, we estimate this model by First-Difference GMM (Arellano
and Bond, 1991). The lagged dependent variable on the
right-hand side captures the effect of an unobservable and prede-
termined policy on current investment if the same policy determi-
nes investment both at time t and at time t  1. In addition, in AB
models we address reverse causation by using the lagged levels of
an endogenous regressor to instrument its contemporaneous
ﬁrst-differences. For example, if funds for investment at time t
are obtained in the previous period, unobserved credit demand
may affect Dlev f ðt1Þ determining reverse causation. However, the
risk that the demand for investment at time t determines the level
of debt at time t  2 is lower, and we can use lev f ðt2Þ as an internal
instrument for Dlev f ðt1Þ.
In a different model, we follow the same approach of Guariglia
(2008) to allow for non-linearities in the relation between
cash-ﬂow and investment, and to investigate the existence of a dif-
ferential impact of leverage on investment conditional on internal
resources. The model that we estimate is the following:
Ift=Kf ðt1Þ ¼ a0 þ a1If ðt1Þ=Kf ðt2Þ þ a2Dsft þ a3Dsf ðt1Þ
þ a4a½CFft=sft  NGCFft þ a4b½CFft=sft MDCFft 
þ a4c½CFft=sft  HICFft þ a5a½lev f ðt1Þ  NGCFft 
þ a5b½lev f ðt1Þ MDCFft þ a5c½lev f ðt1Þ  HICFft
þ v f þ v s þ v t þ eft ð4Þ
If the negative effect of leverage on investment is stronger for liq-
uidity constrained companies, the three coefﬁcients a5a;a5b and
a5c are expected to be negative with a5a < a5b < a5c . If instead the
effect of leverage on investment holds only for ﬁrms with insufﬁ-
cient liquidity the only coefﬁcient that is expect to be negative
and signiﬁcant is a5a.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
All exporters NGCFit MDCFit HICFit LLEVit MLEVit HLEVit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: ﬁnancial attributes
Real assets 7,336 7,562 6,920 8,570 9,116 6,534 7,732
(75,396) (67,157) (71,017) (91,519) (67,823) (71,908) (90,759)
Ift=Kf ðt1Þ 0.154 0.109 0.151 0.189 0.131 0.156 0.175
(0.253) (0.225) (0.245) (0.286) (0.231) (0.246) (0.284)
Dsft 0.031 0.098 0.025 0.128 0.029 0.038 0.022
(0.215) (0.242) (0.195) (0.212) (0.221) (0.212) (0.215)
CFft=sft 0.062 0.064 0.050 0.172 0.064 0.056 0.064
(0.081) (0.060) (0.028) (0.064) (0.080) (0.074) (0.088)
lev ft 0.272 0.290 0.263 0.289 0.026 0.244 0.571
(0.220) (0.227) (0.210) (0.242) (0.036) (0.112) (0.126)
lev2ft 0.168 0.231 0.160 0.155 0.014 0.144 0.364
(0.168) (0.216) (0.155) (0.167) (0.024) (0.099) (0.165)
Panel B: exports & performance
# Destinations 16.321 15.704 15.682 15.147 16.359 17.019 15.413
(19.876) (19.380) (19.226) (18.106) (19.644) (20.199) (19.643)
# HS6 Products 21.576 21.244 20.891 20.928 21.933 22.277 20.462
(34.207) (33.638) (32.512) (33.440) (33.055) (34.235) (35.716)
Mean export value 187,256 176,359 214,296 123,438 201,971 171,287 205,230
(3,890,437) (2,705,921) (4,818,172) (2,096,056) (4,192,683) (3,662,757) (4,030,908)
uv it 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.034 0.025 0.012 0.001
(0.934) (0.934) (0.908) (0.965) (0.973) (0.924) (0.914)
Qit 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.043 0.013 0.002 0.006
(1.298) (1.319) (1.290) (1.296) (1.305) (1.294) (1.297)
kapintft 4.032 4.244 3.834 4.821 4.177 4.040 3.854
(1.146) (1.178) (1.005) (1.115) (1.233) (1.078) (1.151)
expintft 0.216 0.230 0.206 0.226 0.219 0.208 0.229
(0.253) (0.261) (0.246) (0.269) (0.260) (0.243) (0.262)
tfpft 1.346 1.140 1.280 1.578 1.504 1.391 1.131
(1.179) (1.179) (1.149) (1.141) (1.195) (1.145) (1.193)
# Obs. (Firm-year) 234,698 22,602 111,611 26,755 61,205 112,288 58,977
# Firms 52,528 5,143 21,986 6,102 13,712 24,005 13,811
# Flows(HS6-dest.-year) 4,958,624 461,813 2,130,867 525,417 1,207,790 2,467,470 1,274,903
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of each of the variables, computed on samples of ﬁrm-year observations including all exporters
(column 1), exporters with negative cash-ﬂow (column2), exporters with positive cash-ﬂow but below the 75th percentile of the distribution at the industry-year level
(column 3), exporters with cash-ﬂow aboth the 75th percentile (column 4), exporters with leverage below the 25th percentile at the industry-year level (column 5), exporters
with leverage above the 25th and below the 75th percentile (column 6), and exporters with leverage above the 75th percentile (column 7). uv fpdt and Qfpdt are normalized by
subtracting the mean level of these variables at HS6-destination level and dividing by the standard deviation computed at the same level.
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Flow-level export data provide sufﬁcient cross-sectional varia-
tions in the main variables of interest to test the validity of Hyp
1: when comparing varieties of the same product exported to the
same market, is it the case that the exports of more leveraged com-
panies is characterized by lower quality? The ‘quality model’ that
answers this questions takes the following speciﬁcation:
Q it ¼ cpd þ b1lev ft þ Z0ftcþ Z0sthþ gf þ gs þ gt þ it ð5Þ
where the subscript i refers to a single variety (i.e., a unique
ﬁrm-product-destination triplet), the term cpd is a
product-destination ﬁxed-effect, while the terms gf ;gs and gt are
respectively ﬁrm-, sector- and year-speciﬁc ﬁxed effect. The error





tively include observable ﬁrm-level and industry-level controls as
described in Section 3. To maximize the number of ﬂow-level obser-
vations retained in the estimation sample, we introduce in the
model the contemporaneous value of lev instead of its ﬁrst lag.23
Endogeneity issues that may compromise the identiﬁcation of
the causal effect of leverage are more difﬁcult to address in the23 In an unreported robustness check we estimate all quality models with the ﬁrst
lag of lev instead of the contemporaneous value. Results are not qualitatively different
(same sign and signiﬁcance). However, the number of ﬂow-level observations is
greatly diminished because many ﬁrms do not export the same product to the same
destination continuously over the period of the analysis.quality model. This is because a variety’s ‘quality’ at time t depends
on a ﬁrm’s current and past effort to identify consumers’ prefer-
ences, to develop a consistent product, and to promote and adver-
tise it in a particular market. Hence, it is less clear whether lagged
values of lev are valid instruments for the present value of this vari-
able in the quality model. These concerns prevent us from using
internal instruments to deal with the endogeneity of lev. We
instead construct two external instruments for an exporter’s level
of leverage that are exogenous with respect to its quality choice
and unobserved idiosyncratic shocks. These instruments are intro-
duced in ﬁrst-stage regressions on lev and excluded from
second-stage regressions on Q it when Model (5) is estimated by
2SLS.
The ﬁrst instrument lev slt is the mean level of lev computed
across the non-exporting ﬁrms that belong to the same 2-digit
ISIC industry s, and that are based in the same administrative
department l of each exporter.24 Because common shocks in the
credit supply affect both this instrument and an exporter’s level of
leverage, we expect this instrument to correlate with the endoge-
nous regressor, but to affect an exporter’s quality choice only indi-
rectly through lev. The power of this instrument in explaining
individual ﬁrms’ capital structure is supported by previous evidence
in the empirical literature suggesting that the level of leverage in the24 France is geographically divided in 101 administrative departments, and this is
the unit that we use to characterize the location of the ﬁrm. Non-exporting ﬁrms are
observed in FICUS but they are excluded from the estimation sample.
25 Firm-level ﬁxed effects in ﬂow-level regressions contribute to minimize this risk.
26 These ﬁgures are computed as: ð0:571 0:244Þ  a^5  10:154, where 0.571 is the
average level of leverage in the group of high-leverage exporters, 0.244 is the average
level of leverage in the group of medium-leverage exporters, and 0.154 is the average
investment rate in the whole sample (see Table 2).
27 Because the majority of ﬁrms in the sample are not quoted, it is not possible to
test whether the impact of leverage on investment changes depending on a ﬁrm’s
Tobin’s q-ratio as in Lang et al. (1996).
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ﬁrms (e.g., Frank and Goyal, 2009).
The second instrument rslt is the average interest rate across
non-exporting ﬁrms in the same industry and location of the expor-
ter. This instrument is computed as the average ratio of interest
rate payments over debt. The validity of rsl as an instrument for
lev depends on the following two assumptions: exogeneity with
respect to individual exporters’ choices, and the absence of a direct
effect on Q it . Because these instruments are not affected by the
unobserved decisions made by exporters, we argue that they suc-
cessfully address the most serious source of bias arising when we
estimate the impact of lev ft on Q it . Arguably, these instruments
may still be correlated with industry-speciﬁc characteristics affect-
ing both the output quality of individual exporters and their levels
of debt. To mitigate these concerns, both the ﬁrst- and
second-stage equations of Instrumental Variable models include
ﬁrm-level or industry-level ﬁxed effects capturing the inﬂuence
of time-invariant industry level factors on a ﬁrm’s capital structure
and export quality, and time-varying indicators of industry con-
centration and R&D intensity in a ﬁrm’s own industry and in the
industries of its suppliers and customers. These controls further
reinforce the tenability of the conditional exclusion restriction
applied to our instruments.
Model (5) regresses ﬁrm-level explanatory variables on a
ﬂow-level dependent variable. Because multiple export ﬂows can
be generated by the same exporter, standard errors are clustered
at the ﬁrm-level. For robustness, we also estimate the model on
ﬁrm-level observations by using as a dependent variable the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of quality (Q ft) instead of the
variety-speciﬁc one (Q it). Firm-level regressions are also used to
test Hyp 2. More speciﬁcally, we test whether the effect of debt
on quality is conditional on liquidity by estimating the following
equation:
Q ft ¼ b0 þ b1a½lev f ðt1Þ  NGCFf ðt1Þ þ b1b½lev f ðt1Þ
MDCFf ðt1Þ þ b1c½lev f ðt1Þ  HICFf ðt1Þ þ Z0ftcþ Z0sth
þ gf þ gs þ gt þ ft ð6Þ
Because ﬁrm-level panel data are less affected by discontinuity than
ﬂow-level data, this model includes lagged values of the regressors
of interest without causing a great reduction of the estimation sam-
ple. Model (6) is estimated by RE, FE and by Fixed-Effect 2SLS (IVFE).
The latter applies 2SLS to the data after that the ﬁrm-level ﬁxed
effect gf is removed from the error by within-group transformation.
Notice, that this estimator will deliver the most conservative esti-
mates as it both controls for ﬁrm-level unobserved time-varying
factors (by IV) and for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects (by FE). The set of
excluded instruments used to estimate 2SLS and IVFE models
includes the three interactions ½ lev slðt1Þ  NGCFf ðt1Þ; ½ lev slðt1Þ
MDCFf ðt1Þ, and ½ lev slðt1Þ HICFf ðt1Þ.
Arguably, industry-level ﬁxed effects may not be sufﬁcient to
eliminate the endogeneity of leverage that arises because an
exporter’s level of debt depends on the product-market structure
in the destinations it serves. Indeed, the nature of competition
may be different across export destinations, even within very dis-
aggregated product categories. We adopt different strategies in
ﬂow-level and ﬁrm-level regressions to address this issue. In
ﬂow-level regressions product-destination speciﬁc ﬁxed effects
control for different market structures across export destinations.
In these regressions the identiﬁcation of the parameters relies on
variations in leverage and quality across French exporters compet-
ing in the same market. In ﬁrm-level regressions, the dependent
variable is obtained by averaging the quality of a ﬁrms’ varieties
demeaned at the product-destination level. Hence, the ﬁrm-leveldependent variable does not depend on the set of destinations
served by the ﬁrm.25
5. Results
5.1. Leverage and investment
Table 3 reports the results obtained when the investment mod-
els speciﬁed by Eq. (3) (col. 1, 3, 5) and Eq. (4) (col. 2, 4, 6) are
respectively estimated by RE, FE and AB. A negative coefﬁcient a^5
of lev f ðt1Þ is obtained across all methods used to estimate Model
(3). This coefﬁcient ranges from 0.195 (FE) to 0.065 (AB). This
coefﬁcient is economically signiﬁcant and it implies that every-
thing else equal a ﬁrm increasing the level of debt from 0.244
(mean level of lev in the MLEV sample) to 0:571 (mean level of
lev in the HLEV sample) invests on average 41% less (according to
FE estimates) or 13% less (according to AB estimates) than the aver-
age ﬁrm in the whole sample of exporters.26 The fact that the esti-
mated impact of leverage on investment is less negative in the
dynamic speciﬁcation of the model suggests that the negative effect
of leverage is partly absorbed by the coefﬁcient on the lagged depen-
dent variable. This happens if the level of debt at time t  1 affects
both investment at time t  1 and at time t. Despite quantitative dif-
ferences in the estimated parameters, both results from the dynamic
and the static speciﬁcations suggest that leverage affects negatively
future investment.27
When the static speciﬁcation of Model (4) is estimated by RE
and FE we ﬁnd clear evidence that the negative impact of leverage
on investment is stronger when ﬁrms generate insufﬁcient internal
resources to cover operating costs (i.e., when NGCFft ¼ 1). The esti-
mated coefﬁcient a^5a of the term ½lev f ðt1Þ  NGCFf ðt1Þ is consis-
tently more negative than a^5b and a^5c , that are respectively the
estimated coefﬁcients of the terms ½lev f ðt1Þ MDCFf ðt1Þ and
½lev f ðt1Þ  HICFf ðt1Þ. However, while v2 tests clearly reject that
a^5a is statistically equal to a^5b and a^5c , they fail to reject the statis-
tical equivalence between a^5b and a^5c . Results are less clear for the
dynamic speciﬁcation. The AB point estimate a^5a is more negative
than the AB estimates a^5b and a^5c. Equality tests on these parame-
ters suggest that the effect of leverage is more negative for ﬁrm
with negative cash-ﬂow than it is for ﬁrms with medium
cash-ﬂow. However, the effect of leverage on investment in this
speciﬁcation appears statistically equal between ﬁrms with high
and negative cash-ﬂow. Overall, we can conclude that leverage
has a negative impact on French exporters’ investment, and that
this effect is stronger for companies with low cash-ﬂow.
5.2. Leverage and export quality
We move now to the results of the quality model. Table 4
reports the results obtained by estimating two speciﬁcations of
the quality model on ﬂow-level (col. 1–6), and on ﬁrm-level (col.
7–10) observations. We refer to speciﬁcation (a) as the short spec-
iﬁcation, as it includes only the main regressors of interest in addi-
tion to ﬁxed effects. In the long speciﬁcation (b) we introduce
additional ﬁrm-level and industry-level controls. The different
coefﬁcient of lev across the two speciﬁcations suggests the pres-
ence of upward bias when the model is estimated by OLS on
Table 3
The effect of leverage on investment.
RE FE AB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
If ðt1Þ=Kf ðt2Þ 0.063
⁄⁄⁄ 0.064⁄⁄⁄
(0.007) (0.006)





CFft  NGCFft 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.067⁄⁄⁄ 0.027
(0.021) (0.026) (0.442)
CFft MDCFft 0.118⁄⁄⁄ 0.014 2.251⁄⁄⁄
(0.024) (0.030) (0.386)
CFft  HICFft 0.117⁄⁄⁄ 0.094⁄⁄⁄ 1.225⁄⁄⁄
(0.014) (0.019) (0.165)
lev f ;ðt1Þ  NGCFf ;ðt1Þ 0.118⁄⁄⁄ 0.218⁄⁄⁄ 0.083⁄⁄⁄
(0.005) (0.007) (0.018)
lev f ;ðt1Þ MDCFf ;ðt1Þ 0.066⁄⁄⁄ 0.186⁄⁄⁄ 0.058⁄⁄⁄
(0.004) (0.006) (0.015)
lev f ;ðt1Þ  HICFf ;ðt1Þ 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.183⁄⁄⁄ 0.062⁄⁄⁄
(0.005) (0.007) (0.017)
Dsft 0.163
⁄⁄⁄ 0.163⁄⁄⁄ 0.109⁄⁄⁄ 0.106⁄⁄⁄ 0.263⁄ 0.198⁄
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.157) (0.113)
Dsf ðt1Þ 0.145
⁄⁄⁄ 0.142⁄⁄⁄ 0.077⁄⁄⁄ 0.076⁄⁄⁄ 0.070⁄⁄⁄ 0.065⁄⁄⁄
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.011)
v2 (p-value)
a^5a ¼ a^5b 0.000 0.000 0.026
a^5a ¼ a^5c 0.000 0.000 0.194
a^5b ¼ a^5c 0.113 0.592 0.698
t-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
s-FE Yes Yes No No No No
f-FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
J (p-value) 0.496 0.162
Sargan (p-value) 0.170 0.099
ar1(p-value) 0.000 0.000
ar2(p-value) 0.828 0.732
Firms 30,740 30,740 30,740 30,740 23,069 23,069
Obs. 143,806 143,806 143,806 143,806 111,435 111,435
Notes: The panel unit is set at the ﬁrm-level. Models in columns 5–6 are estimated using a GMM ﬁrst-difference speciﬁcation (AB). Time dummies are included in all
speciﬁcations. Internal instruments (2nd and 3rd lags) are used for the endogenous variables If ðt1Þ=Kf ðt2Þ , lev f ðt1Þ , CFft , Dsft , lev f ;ðt1Þ  NGCFf ;ðt1Þ , lev f ;ðt1Þ MDCFf ;ðt1Þ,
lev f ;ðt1Þ  HICFf ;ðt1Þ . Dsf ðt1Þ is treated as predetermined and included in the instrument set. Jðp valueÞ is the p-value of the Hansen overidentiﬁcation test, while
Sarganðp valueÞ is the p-value of the Sargan overidentiﬁcation test. ar1 and ar2 are respectively the p-values from the tests for ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation in the
error terms. The table presents p-values from v2 tests of equality between the coefﬁcients obtained interacting lev f ðt1Þ with different cash-ﬂow categories. Standard errors
are reported in parenthesis and are robust to heteroscedasticity. Signiﬁcance levels: ⁄.1, ⁄⁄.05, ⁄⁄⁄.01.
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if not eliminate, the omitted variable bias arising from unobserved
factors that are positively correlated with quality and credit
demand. Flow-level 2SLS estimates of the short and the long spec-
iﬁcations are respectively reported in columns 3–4 and 5–6.
For 2SLS and IVFE models, we present both the estimates from
ﬁrst-stage regressions on the endogenous variable lev ft and from
second-stage regressions on Q it and Q

ft . As expected, the average
level of debt lev sl across non-exporters, is strongly and positively
correlated with the individual leverage of exporters that operate
in the same industry and the same location, while the coefﬁcient
on the average interest rate rsl is negative but signiﬁcant only in
ﬁrm-level regressions (col. 8 and 10).28 Overidentiﬁcation tests
strongly support the validity of our instrument set. The negative
coefﬁcient of tfpfp in the long speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst-stage model
on lev indicates that ﬁrms with higher levels of debt are also the least28 In an unreported robustness test we repeat the estimation of the 2SLS models
(both at the ﬂow- and at the ﬁrm-level) including in ﬁrst-stage regressions only the
statistically signiﬁcant instrument lev sl . Results are robust to this alternative
speciﬁcation. We choose to report the 2SLS model with both instruments as we ﬁnd
that the inclusion of rsl increases the precision of the estimates (smaller standard
errors), and it allows us to conduct overidentiﬁcation tests.productive ones. Although we refrain from inferring causality, the
negative relation between quality and leverage suggests that the
average level of debt is higher for the least productive companies.
The estimated impact of leverage on Q it is stronger in
second-stage 2SLS estimates, and its signiﬁcance is more robust
to the inclusion of ﬁrm-level controls than in OLS models.
However, the cluster-robust standard errors associated with these
estimates are large and they do not decrease much when controls
are introduced passing from the short (col. 3–4) to the long speciﬁ-
cation (col. 5–6). The reason why we obtain imprecise estimates is
that ﬁrm-level regressors on the right-hand side of the model vary
less than the ﬂow-level dependent variable. Firm-level regressions
(col. 7–10), where the dependent variable is the weighted average
of a ﬁrm’s relative quality across export destinations and products,
improve the precision of the estimates. On the basis of the esti-
mated coefﬁcient of lev reported in column 9, when leverage
increases from 0:244 (mean level in the MLEV sample) to 0:571
(mean level in the HLEV sample) export quality decreases by 0.8
standard deviations of this indicator.2929 This ﬁgure is computed as ð0:571 0:244Þ  b^1  10:934, where 0.934 is the
standard deviation of Q it in the whole sample.
Table 4
The effect of leverage on output quality.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel unit: Flow i Firm f
Estimator: OLS 2SLS IVFE





it lev ft Q

it lev ft Q

ft lev ft Q

ft lev ft
lev ft 0.040 0.070⁄⁄ 2.037⁄⁄⁄ 1.684⁄⁄⁄ 1.342⁄ 2.303⁄⁄⁄
(0.027) (0.028) (0.548) (0.538) (0.767) (0.833)
ageft 0.029 0.039 0.005 0.042 0.026⁄⁄⁄
(0.027) (0.032) (0.012) (0.028) (0.003)
age2ft 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.004
⁄⁄⁄
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001)
groupft 0.015 0.035
⁄⁄ 0.012⁄⁄ 0.040⁄⁄⁄ 0.008⁄⁄⁄
(0.014) (0.016) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001)
foreignft 0.053
⁄⁄⁄ 0.024 0.016⁄ 0.054⁄⁄⁄ 0.007⁄⁄⁄
(0.020) (0.022) (0.009) (0.014) (0.002)
tfpft 0.049
⁄⁄⁄ 0.006 0.020⁄⁄⁄ 0.128⁄⁄⁄ 0.038⁄⁄⁄
(0.010) (0.013) (0.004) (0.032) (0.001)
labft 0.040
⁄⁄⁄ 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.009⁄⁄⁄ 0.305⁄⁄⁄ 0.047⁄⁄⁄
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.040) (0.001)
kapintft 0.070
⁄⁄⁄ 0.086⁄⁄⁄ 0.010⁄⁄⁄ 0.186⁄⁄⁄ 0.062⁄⁄⁄
(0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.052) (0.001)
expintft 0.360
⁄⁄⁄ 0.374⁄⁄⁄ 0.016 0.680⁄⁄⁄ 0.007⁄⁄
(0.021) (0.026) (0.010) (0.020) (0.003)
HIst 0.414 0.517 0.089 0.366 0.087⁄⁄
(0.287) (0.400) (0.122) (0.280) (0.044)
ClientHIst 1.602⁄⁄ 2.257⁄⁄ 0.412 0.760 0.140
(0.787) (0.896) (0.318) (0.658) (0.104)
SupplierHIst 0.285 0.553 0.809⁄⁄⁄ 0.897 0.132
(1.048) (0.952) (0.260) (0.635) (0.101)
RDst 0.824⁄⁄⁄ 1.363⁄⁄⁄ 0.083 0.309 0.021
(0.270) (0.249) (0.076) (0.217) (0.033)
ClientRDst 1.669
⁄⁄⁄ 2.040⁄⁄⁄ 0.015 0.444 0.054
(0.548) (0.515) (0.127) (0.445) (0.071)
SupplierRDst 0.063 0.680
⁄ 0.043 0.003 0.009
(0.375) (0.403) (0.145) (0.315) (0.050)
levsr 0.172
⁄⁄⁄ 0.166⁄⁄⁄ 0.050⁄⁄⁄ 0.048⁄⁄⁄
(0.030) (0.030) (0.007) (0.007)
rsr 0.066 0.060 0.045⁄⁄ 0.037⁄⁄
(0.084) (0.083) (0.018) (0.018)
t-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pd-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
s-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
f-FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
J (p-value) 0.389 0.605 0.234 0.297
F-stat 17.031 15.007 27.324 25.493
Obs. 4,836,717 4,836,297 4,784,578 4,784,578 4,784,158 4,784,158 216,192 216,192 216,154 216,154
Notes: In ﬂow-level regressions the panel unit is set at the variety level (ﬁrm-HS6 product-destination). The panel unit in ﬁrm-level regressions is set at the level of the
individual exporter. The ﬁrm-level quality estimator Qft is obtained collapsing ﬂow-level estimators according to the methodology detailed in the text. All regressors vary at
the ﬁrm-level with the exception of the excluded instrumentslevsl and rsl that are computed at the location-industry level. The J (p-value) is the p-value of the Hansen J test of
the validity of the excluded instruments while F-stat is the F statistics for the explanatory power of the excluded instruments in ﬁrst stage regressions. t-FE are individual year
ﬁxed effects while pd-FE are HS6 product-destination ﬁxed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the cluster unit is set at the ﬁrm level.
Speciﬁcation (a) includes only the regressor of interest lev ft and ﬁxed effects, while speciﬁcation (b) includes a set of ﬁrm-level controls. Signiﬁcance levels: ⁄.1, ⁄⁄.05, ⁄⁄⁄.01.
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highly leveraged corporate ﬁnancial structure hampers a ﬁrm’s
ability to compete in foreign markets through product quality.
The coefﬁcients of the ﬁrm-level controls are in line with previous
studies on the determinant of export quality; larger and more pro-
ductive ﬁrms with greater capital intensity export products with
higher average quality (Verhoogen, 2012). Because the variables
we use to control for these characteristics are endogenous, we
avoid giving a causal interpretation to the coefﬁcients. Firms’ age
is negatively associated with export quality and this result can
be explained by self-selection of the best young ﬁrms into the
export market. Because young ﬁrms face greater barriers to start
exporting, such as the costs of establishing for the ﬁrst time distri-
bution networks, those that ﬁnd proﬁtable to export are conceiv-
ably the most productive ones, and the ones selling high quality
products.First stage regressions on lev ft control for heterogeneity in
ﬁnancial structure across industries by including industry-level
ﬁxed effects (col. 6) or ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects (col. 10). Despite
the inclusion of these ﬁxed effects, the point estimate of the coef-
ﬁcient on HIst is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in the
ﬁrm-level speciﬁcation. This parameter should be interpreted as
the reaction of a ﬁrm’s debt level to greater concentration in the
product market. A positive relationship between industry concen-
tration and debt levels is consistent with previous ﬁndings in the
capital structure literature (MacKay and Phillips, 2005). Positive
changes in the concentration of clients’ and suppliers’ industries
are respectively positively and negatively correlated with a ﬁrms’
debt level, but these effects are not signiﬁcant when we control
for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (col. 10). After controlling for industry-ﬁxed
effects, time-variations in R&D intensity in a ﬁrm’s own industry
and in the industries of its suppliers and clients do not appear to
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positive variations in the concentration of clients’ and own indus-
try R&D intensity appear affecting negatively a ﬁrm’s quality. This
ﬁnding is consistent with previous empirical evidence suggesting
that the R&D investment of French ﬁrms is generally countercycli-
cal (Aghion et al., 2012). Hence, because our indicator of quality is
based on sales, and R&D intensity increases in periods of lower
demand, it is not surprising to ﬁnd a negative correlation between
quality and industry-level measures of R&D intensity.
Table 5 reports the estimated parameters of the ‘short’ and the
‘long’ speciﬁcations of Model (6), that is used to test Hyp 2.30 The
point estimates of the coefﬁcients b1a, b1b and b1c are consistently
negative across speciﬁcations and estimation techniques. However,
we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant effect of leverage on quality only
for ﬁrms with negative cash ﬂow. The v2 tests used to compare
the coefﬁcients on the interactions terms conﬁrm that b1a is signiﬁ-
cantly different from b1b and from b1c .
31 These results support Hyp 2
whereby debt affects quality depending on a ﬁrm’s liquidity. A
caveat applies to this conclusion. Even thus coefﬁcients on
lev f ðt1Þ MDCFf ðt1Þ and lev f ðt1Þ  HICFf ðt1Þ are insigniﬁcant, they
are nevertheless negative, suggesting a more heterogeneous effect
of debt across ﬁrms with positive cash-ﬂow.
This section concludes by testing Hyp 3 concerning the differen-
tial impact of leverage across ﬁrms operating in industries with a
different level of concentration. In previous regressions, differences
in product-market structure were captured by industry-speciﬁc,
market-speciﬁc or ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and by a series of
industry-level covariates. Despite these controls the estimated
coefﬁcients on lev ft express the average effect of this variable
across ﬁrms pooled together from heterogeneous industries. We
now investigate this heterogeneity by estimating speciﬁcation (b)
of the quality model (5) on samples of ﬁrms from industries with
different market concentration. Table 6 reports the model esti-
mated on low-concentration (LH), medium-concentration (MH),
high-concentration (HH) industries.32 Consistently with Hyp 3,
regression results suggest that leverage has a more negative impact
on ﬁrms that operate in less concentrated industries. The estimated
coefﬁcient on lev ft is negative and signiﬁcant in the
low-concentration and medium-concentration samples, while it is
insigniﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels for the
high-concentration sample.
Table 6 reports the results from regressions estimated on
sub-samples of ﬁrms belonging to industries with different R&D
intensity (col. 4–6). According to the theoretical results in Long
and Malitz (1985) more leveraged ﬁrms have a cost disadvantage
in undertaking investment in intangibles, and we should expect
high levels of debt to affect disproportionally more ﬁrms in R&D
intensive industries. Consistently, we ﬁnd that the impact of lever-
age on quality is twice as negative for medium-R&D intensity
industries than it is for low-R&D industries. However, the coefﬁ-
cient on leverage is not signiﬁcant for ﬁrms operating in
high-R&D intensity. This result may be determined by the30 For this regression the ‘short’ speciﬁcation includes the term CFf ;ðt1Þ . The
inclusion of this additional term is necessary to avoid omitted variable bias because
the three dummies interacted with lev are based on this variable. Results do not
change if instead of CFf ;ðt1Þ we introduce the three un-interacted dummies
NGCF;MDCF and HICF.
31 On the contrary the same tests fail to reject the equality of b1b and b1c across all
speciﬁcations. Unreported 2SLS estimates on pooled data are in line with those
obtained from the RE model.
32 Low-concentration industries are those with Herﬁndahl Index lower or equal the
25th percentile of the distribution across industries, medium-concentration indus-
tries have the Index included between the 25th and the 75th percentile,
high-concentration are industries with Herﬁndahl above the 75th percentile. The
same approach is used to distinguish industries by R&D intensity. Results are
insensitive to alternative categorization of concentration and R&D intensity classes.self-selection of ﬁrms with different attributes into more research
intensive industries, in the case these attributes offset the negative
effect of debt on quality.
5.3. Robustness tests
This section reports a battery of robustness exercises conducted
to test the sensitivity of our main results to the use of alternative
measures of quality, leverage and liquidity, and to the use of a dif-
ferent instrument for leverage. We also investigate the presence of
non-linearity in the effect of leverage on quality.
In the trade literature, the unit-values of the exported varieties
are commonly used as an indirect proxy for output quality (e.g.,
Bastos and Silva, 2010; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Manova and
Zhang, 2012).33 This proxy relies on the assumption that both the
price and the unit-value of a variety increase monotonically in out-
put quality. Upon accepting this assumption, it is possible to inves-
tigate the ﬁrm-level determinants of product quality by
comparing, within narrowly deﬁned product categories, the
unit-values of the varieties exported by different companies. Given
our speciﬁc interest on leverage as a determinant of output quality,
the measure of quality that we use in the previous section should be
preferred to unit-values, because higher levels of debt may affect a
ﬁrm’s pricing strategy in addition to its output quality (Secchi
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, regressions on unit-values can be used
to test whether our results depend crucially on our preferred
measure of quality. Hence, we re-estimate the ﬂow-level regressions
reported in Table 4 by using the log unit-value of a variety logðuv itÞ
as the dependent variable. By including product-destination ﬁxed
effects in all regressions, we force identiﬁcation to rely on
unit-value variations across varieties of the same HS6 product
exported to the same destination by ﬁrms with different leverage.
The results from this exercise are reported in Table 7. A negative
coefﬁcient on lev ft is found across all speciﬁcations and estimation
techniques, suggesting that ﬁrms with higher levels of debt export
relatively cheaper varieties. We conclude that our main result is
robust to the use of an alternative measure of quality.
Columns 1 of Table 8 reports estimates obtained when leverage
is measured by lev2 instead of lev. This variable is computed as the
ratio of the book value of a ﬁrm’s debt over the book value of its
total assets. Estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively similar
to those obtained in Table 5.34 In the speciﬁcation reported in col-
umn 2, we interact this new measure of leverage with the three cash
ﬂow categories. Previous results are largely conﬁrmed as we ﬁnd a
negative effect of leverage on quality only for ﬁrms with negative
and medium cash-ﬂow.
In column 3 we adopt an alternative classiﬁcation of the cate-
gories of liquidity based on the same underlying continuous vari-
able CFf ðt1Þ. As in previous estimates NEGF is still a dummy for
ﬁrms with negative cash-ﬂow, CF25th is a dummy for ﬁrms with
positive cash-ﬂow but below the 25th percentile, CF75th between
the 25th and the 75th percentiles, and CF100th over the 75th per-
centile of the cash-ﬂow distribution within an industry-year cell.35
In column 4 we base this new classiﬁcation on a different underlying
measure of liquidity. This measure is obtained as the difference
between a ﬁrm’s availability and a ﬁrm’s need for working capital,
divided by operating expenses that include wages and the cost of
materials. The availability of working capital is measured as a ﬁrm’s33 See Note 17 on the construction of unit-values with trade data.
34 We compare this robustness with estimates in Table 5 because we include here
the same set of controls as in the long speciﬁcation reported in that table. In particular
the inclusion of the cash-ﬂow variable reduces the sample size compared to the
speciﬁcations reported in Table 4 making a comparison with the estimates in that
table inappropriate.
35 We wish to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness check.
Table 5
The effect of leverage on quality conditional on liquidity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator: RE FE IVFE












lev f ðt1Þ  NGCFf ðt1Þ 0.132⁄⁄⁄ 0.090⁄⁄⁄ 0.149⁄⁄⁄ 0.121⁄⁄⁄ 0.550⁄⁄⁄ 0.437⁄⁄⁄
(0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.141) (0.163)
lev f ðt1Þ MDCFf ðt1Þ 0.014 0.027 0.014 0.035 0.322⁄⁄ 0.261
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.154) (0.174)
lev f ðt1Þ  HICFf ðt1Þ 0.056⁄ 0.004 0.032 0.012 0.205 0.210
(0.031) (0.029) (0.036) (0.035) (0.172) (0.184)
CFf ðt1Þ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)




















HIsðt1Þ 0.440 0.718 0.973⁄⁄
(0.432) (0.475) (0.408)
ClientHIsðt1Þ 1.923⁄⁄ 2.042⁄ 1.879⁄⁄
(0.940) (1.047) (0.769)
SupplierHIsðt1Þ 0.510 0.068 0.561
(0.828) (0.887) (0.814)
RDsðt1Þ 0.345 0.181 1.033⁄⁄⁄
(0.289) (0.333) (0.276)





t-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
s-FE Yes Yes No No No No
f-FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
v2 (p-value)
b^1a ¼ b^1b 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
b^1a ¼ b^1c 0.024 0.048 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.004
b^1b ¼ b^1c 0.138 0.865 0.140 0.911 0.011 0.508
F-stat 331.108 275.764
Obs. 108,678 108,645 108,678 108,645 97,347 97,329
Notes: In all models panel unit is set at the ﬁrm-level. The ﬁrm-level measure of export quality Q^ ft is obtained as detailed in the text. Models are estimated by Random-Effect
(RE), Fixed-Effect (FE) and 2SLS ﬁxed effects (IVFE). In the unreported ﬁrst-stage regressions of the IVFE models the endogenous terms lev f ;ðt1Þ  NGCFf ;ðt1Þ ,
lev f ;ðt1Þ MDCFf ;ðt1Þ , lev f ;ðt1Þ  HICFf ;ðt1Þ are instrumented by three terms obtained by interacting lev sl with NGCFf ;ðt1Þ , MDCFf ;ðt1Þ and HICFf ;ðt1Þ . Because the number of
exogenous instruments equals the number of endogenous instrumented variables, IVFE models are exactly identiﬁed. F-stat is the F statistics for the explanatory power of the
excluded instruments in ﬁrst stage regressions. t-FE are individual year ﬁxed effects while pd-FE are HS6 product-destination ﬁxed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses and the cluster unit is set at the ﬁrm level. Speciﬁcation (a) includes only the regressor of interest lev ft and ﬁxed effects, while speciﬁcation (b)
includes a set of ﬁrm-level controls. Signiﬁcance levels: ⁄.1, ⁄⁄.05, ⁄⁄⁄.01.
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working capital is instead obtained as a ﬁrm’s stocks plus its client’s
debt minus the debt of the ﬁrm to the suppliers. While in column 3
results are insensitive to the alternative deﬁnition of cash-ﬂow cat-
egories, in column 4 we ﬁnd negative and signiﬁcant estimates for
each interaction between lev f ðt1Þ and the different categories of liq-
uidity. This ﬁnding contrasts our previous results supporting Hyp 2.
A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the condi-
tionality of the effect of leverage on CF is related to a ﬁrm’s ability
to generate pledgeable income rather than to its availability of
internal resources. While cash-ﬂow captures a ﬁrms’ ability to gen-
erate pledgeable income, the alternative measure used in this
robustness check is more closely related to the availability of inter-
nal resources relative to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing needs. A recent paper byValta (2012) has shown that the cost of debt is higher for ﬁrms
operating in more competitive industries, and the author interpret
this ﬁnding with the negative effect of competition on a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt margin and pledgeable income. This intuition is also consis-
tent with our previous ﬁnding that leverage has a more negative
effect on quality in industries with low-concentration, where the
ability of ﬁrms to generate cash-ﬂow is hampered by lower proﬁt
margins.
Table 9 reports robustness tests based on Campello (2006). That
paper identiﬁes the impact of debt on ﬁrms’ product market per-
formance by adopting an empirical strategy different from our
own. In this section, by adopting Campello’s approach to address
the endogeneity of leverage, we test the sensitivity of our baseline
results to methodological choices. First, as in the Campello’s paper,
Table 6
Heterogeneous effect of leverage on quality across industries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Split by market concentration Split by R&D intensity
LH MH HH LR MR HR
Firm-level regressions
lev f ;t1 2.570⁄⁄⁄ 1.179⁄⁄⁄ 0.791 0.981⁄ 2.260⁄⁄⁄ 1.019
(0.280) (0.378) (0.739) (0.539) (0.216) (0.912)
Obs. (Firm-year) 54,367 80,053 19,140 14,858 138,702 27,732
Flow-level regressions
lev f ;t1 2.759⁄⁄⁄ 0.920⁄ 2.428 0.920 1.672⁄⁄⁄ 2.064
(0.823) (0.518) (1.758) (1.212) (0.539) (1.538)
Obs. (Flow-year) 1,040,220 2,900,740 843,198 162,656 4,621,502 1,258,000
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates of the coefﬁcient on lev f ;t1 obtained in ﬁrm-level (upper panel) and ﬂow-level (lower panel) regressions on Qft and Q

it . These
regressions are estimated adopting the long speciﬁcation (b). Controls and ﬁxed effects included but not reported. Columns 1–3 report estimates on sub-samples of ﬁrms
belonging to industries with different level of market concentration (ISIC Rev.3: LH = [15,17,20,22,28], MH = [18,19,21,24,25,26,27,29,32,36,37], HH = [23,30,31,33,35]).
Columns 4–5 report regressions on three samples of ﬁrms belonging to industries with different R&D intensity (ISIC Rev.3: LR = [20,21,22,28],
MR = [15,17,18,19,23,24,25,26,27,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37], HR = [24,30,32,33,34,35]). Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the cluster unit is set
at the ﬁrm level. Signiﬁcance levels: ⁄.1, ⁄⁄.05, ⁄⁄⁄.01.
Table 7
The unit-values of exported varieties and ﬁrm leverage.
OLS 2SLS
(a) (b) (a) (b)
logðuv itÞ logðuv itÞ logðuv itÞ lev ft logðuv itÞ lev ft
lev ft 0.044 0.081⁄⁄ 3.124⁄⁄⁄ 2.699⁄⁄⁄






Controls No Yes No No Yes Yes
t-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
pd-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
s-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
J (p-value) 0.681 0.899
F-stat 17.272 15.251
Obs. 4,947,368 4,946,937 4,894,128 4,894,128 4,893,697 4,893,697
Notes: All regressors vary at the ﬁrm-level with the exception of the excluded instruments levsl and rsl that are computed at the location-industry level. The J (p-value) is the
p-value of the Hansen J test of the validity of the excluded instruments while F-stat is the F statistics for the explanatory power of the excluded instruments in ﬁrst stage
regressions. t-FE are individual year ﬁxed effects while pd-FE are HS6 product-destination ﬁxed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and the
cluster unit is set at the ﬁrm level. Speciﬁcation (a) includes only the regressor of interest lev ft and ﬁxed effects, while speciﬁcation (b) includes a set of ﬁrm-level controls.
Firms-level controls in speciﬁcation (b) are not reported but they are the same as those reported in Table 4. Signiﬁcance levels: ⁄.1, ⁄⁄.05, ⁄⁄⁄.01.
36 We adopt the same breaking points as in Campello (2006).
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Tangibility is constructed as the ratio of the book value of tangible
assets over the book value of a ﬁrm’s total assets zTangf ðt1Þ.
Second, we normalize both the regressors and the dependent vari-
able by subtracting to each variable the industry-level mean and
dividing by the industry-level standard deviation. By doing so we
obtain measures of a ﬁrm’s relative export quality zQ f ðt1Þ and
leverage zlev f ðt1Þ with respect to the industry average.
First and second-stage 2SLS estimates obtained by using these
variables in regressions are reported in columns 1 and 2 of the
table. In columns 3 and 4 we report the same exercise but we sub-
stitute the continuous variable for leverage with the dummy
levTop3f ðt1Þ that takes value one if the ﬁrm is in the three top dec-
iles of the leverage distributions. Although these exercises are
based on a different methodological approach, they deliver the
same qualitative results as our baseline speciﬁcation. Hence this
robustness test provides a very convincing indication that there
is indeed a negative relationship between debt levels and output
quality.
Lastly, we investigate the presence of non-linearity in the
impact of leverage on quality. In column 5 we allow the coefﬁcienton zlev f ðt1Þ to vary depending on the level of relative leverage. We
do so by interacting zlev f ðt1Þ with three dummy variables respec-
tively assuming value one if zlev f ðt1Þ is less than 1.5 standard
deviations below the industry mean, if it falls between 1.5 and
1.5 standard deviations, and if it is above 1.5 standard deviations.36
In column 6 we simultaneously allow for non-linearity and for con-
ditional effect on cash-ﬂow. In general, we do not ﬁnd evidence of
non-linearity in the relationship between leverage and quality. The
only exception is for ﬁrms with high cash-ﬂow. For these ﬁrms we
ﬁnd that leverage affects quality only when leverage is above 1.5
standard deviations from the industry mean.
6. Conclusions
This paper advances the understanding of the relationship
between ﬁnancial factors and ﬁrm export behavior by producing
novel results on a ‘quality channel’. It is shown that corporate
ﬁnancial structure determines a ﬁrm’s ability to compete through
quality on foreign markets, which is consistent with models
Table 8
Different measures of leverage and liquidity.









Different measure of leverage
lev2f ðt1Þ 0.448⁄⁄
(0.220)
lev2f ðt1Þ  NGCFf ðt1Þ 0.623⁄⁄⁄
(0.186)
lev2f ðt1Þ MDCFf ðt1Þ 0.450⁄⁄
(0.227)
lev2f ðt1Þ  HICFf ðt1Þ 0.344
(0.260)
Different liquidity groups
lev f ðt1Þ  NGCFf ðt1Þ 0.520⁄⁄⁄
(0.149)
lev f ðt1Þ  CF25thf ðt1Þ 0.358
⁄⁄
(0.156)
lev f ðt1Þ  CF75thf ðt1Þ 0.315
⁄
(0.162)
lev f ðt1Þ  CF100thf ðt1Þ 0.252
(0.170)
Different measure of liquidity and liquidity groups
lev f ðt1Þ  NGLIQf ðt1Þ 2.316⁄⁄⁄
(0.355)
lev f ðt1Þ  LIQ25thf ðt1Þ 2.413
⁄⁄⁄
(0.363)
lev f ðt1Þ  LIQ75thf ðt1Þ 2.374
⁄⁄⁄
(0.364)
lev f ðt1Þ  LIQ100thf ðt1Þ 2.317
⁄⁄⁄
(0.352)
t-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
f-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
J (p-value) 0.861
F-stat 400.615 269.293 239.255 62.086
Obs. 96,525 97,520 97,335 97,335
The table reports IVFE estimates of the long speciﬁcation. Controls are included but
not reported. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:
⁄.1, ⁄⁄.05, ⁄⁄⁄.01.
37 The assumption that the idiosyncratic error in individual preferences follows a
Type I extreme-value distribution is a common assumption of multinomial logit
models.
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incentives to invest in quality-enhancing activities such as adver-
tising and R&D (Long and Malitz, 1985; Maksimovic and Titman,
1991).
Panel regressions and instrumental variable methods are used
to analyze a rich dataset of French exporters covering the period
1997–2007. Our analysis generates robust evidence that debt
ﬁnancing has a negative impact on export quality measured as
the residual from a discrete choice model of foreign consumers’
demand. The distortive impact of debt on investment is a plausible
channel to explain the negative relation between leverage and
quality. Consistently, static and dynamic speciﬁcations of a stan-
dard investment model reveal that leverage hampers investment,
and that this effect is stronger for ﬁrms with negative cash-ﬂow.
Our analysis produces less clear evidence on the role of internal
liquidity in mediating the impact of leverage on quality. A possible
interpretation of our results is that a ﬁrm’s ability to generate
pledgeable income reduces the agency cost of debt and the nega-
tive effects of ﬁnancial leverage on quality. Consistently with this
interpretation we ﬁnd that the negative effect of leverage on qual-
ity is stronger in less-concentrated industries, where competitive
pressure reduces proﬁt margins and leverage cannot be used to
acquire strategic advantage over the competitors.
Our ﬁrm-level results leads to new research questions that call
for further investigation. First, because policies that affect compa-
nies’ corporate ﬁnancial structure may eventually impact on a
country’s export performance, it is worth investigating how corpo-
rate taxation affects a country’s position in the ‘quality ladder’ oftrade. Second, our ﬁndings leads to investigating whether market
based ﬁnancial systems, where ﬁrms have greater access to equity
ﬁnancing and rely less intensively on debt, are more effective in
promoting countries’ non-price competitiveness in international
markets.
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Appendix A
A.1. Derivation of Eq. (1)
The central idea of the discrete choice model of demand con-
sists in inverting the demand function to exploit aggregate market
information to infer the mean utility that each variety of a differen-
tiated product delivers to consumers. The model imposes structure
on demand by assuming that each individual j consumes only one
unit of the variety i that delivers the greatest utility:
uij > ukj 8 k 2 K ð7Þ
where K is a product class encompassing all varieties sharing a cer-
tain degree of substitutability. The set K comprises one or more
‘nests’, which are groups of varieties (indexed by g) characterized
by greater substitutability among one another. To allow for the
nested structure of K, consumers’ utility is modeled according to
the following speciﬁcation:
uij ¼ di þ fig þ ð1 rÞij; 0 6 r < 1 ð8Þ
di ¼ Xijbþ api þ fi; a  0
where di is the expected utility from the consumption of i across all
consumers. This depends on a vector of the varietie’s attributes Xi
and parameters b, on price pi and product quality fi. The terms fjg
and ij are consumers’ deviations from the mean utility di that are
determined by heterogeneous preferences across consumers for dif-
ferent nests of varieties and across varieties belonging to the same
nest. The within-group substitutability parameter r determines the
extent to which different consumers agree on the utility they derive
from selecting i. Ultimately, the negative parameter a captures the
disutility of price that is common across consumers.
By assuming that idiosyncratic deviations in preferences ij fol-
low a Type I extreme-value distribution, the utility function (8) is







where si is both the share of variety i in a particular market and the
expected probability Pi that each consumer chooses good i over the
others. If we assume that consumers ﬁrst choose their favorite ‘nest’
g and then a variety i within g, the probability Pi can be also written
as:
Table 9
Alternative instrument for leverage and non-linearities.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator: 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent: zQft zlev f ðt1Þ zQ













1 < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 1:5r 0.699⁄⁄⁄
(0.266)
1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1:5r 0.753⁄⁄⁄
(0.264)
þ1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1 0.757⁄⁄⁄
(0.272)
For NGCF = 1
ð1 < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 1:5rÞ 0.681⁄⁄
(0.313)
ð1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1:5rÞ 0.791⁄⁄⁄
(0.298)
ðþ1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1Þ 0.672⁄⁄
(0.319)
For MDCF = 1
ð1 < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 1:5rÞ 0.787⁄⁄⁄
(0.268)
ð1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1:5rÞ 0.823⁄⁄⁄
(0.266)
ðþ1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1Þ 0.805⁄⁄⁄
(0.275)
For HICF = 1
ð1 < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 1:5rÞ 0.486⁄
(0.289)
ð1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1:5rÞ 0.442
(0.306)
ðþ1:5r < zlev f ðt1Þ 6 þ1Þ 0.769⁄⁄
(0.370)
t-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
s-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 121.275 112.574
Obs. 108,666 108,666 109,352 109,352 109,352 109,352
Notes: The table reports 2SLS estimates from the long speciﬁcation of the quality model regressed on ﬁrm-level observations. Controls are included but not reported.
z variables are obtained by subtracting to each ﬁrm-level variable by its industry-level mean and subtracting by its industry-level standard deviation. Columns 5 and 6
report only 2nd stage estimates on quality. Cluster-robust standard errors reported in parentheses. The variables xr < zlev f ðt1Þ  yr are obtained by interacting zlev f ðt1Þ
with a dummy that assumes value one only if zlev f ðt1Þ is greater than x industry-level standard deviations and smaller than y standard deviations.
Signiﬁcance levels: ⁄.1, ⁄⁄.05, ⁄⁄⁄.01.
38 The outside variety is a variety for which we do not identify the mean utility.
Instead we normalize it to 0 and express the mean utility of all other varieties in
relation to the outside variety (Nevo, 2000). In practice, the market share of the
outside variety is computes as so ¼ 1
P
i2K si , where
P
i2Ksi is the aggregate share of
the inside varieties.
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where Pg is the probability that the choice of the consumer falls on
one of the products in group g, and g is an index for each of the vari-
eties’ ‘nests’ that compose the wider set K. By expressing the prob-
























the expression for Pi can be simpliﬁed if we normalize the probabil-
ity of choosing each i by the probability of choosing an outsidevariety delivering expected utility do ¼ 0.38 The probability of







taking the log difference of Pi and Po we obtain:












¼ ½lnðPgÞ  lnðPoÞ=ð1 rÞ. After substituting the
right-hand side of this expression in (15), and after some simpliﬁca-
tion we obtain:
Table 10
Summary statistics on the estimation of Eq. (1).
Mean Median 1st Quart. 3rd Quart.
a^FE 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000
a^IVFE 0.100 0.004 0.018 0.001
r^FE 0.942 0.946 0.918 0.966
r^IVFE 0.564 0.612 0.387 0.791
ElastIVFE 2.560 0.302 1.084 0.056
Observations HS4 14,647 4,735 1,479 14,800
5% Sign. a^IVFE 77%
5% Sign. r^IVFE 92%
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because the observed market shares si; so and si=g can be thought as
empirical counterparts of Pi; Po and Pi=g then Eq. (1) that we esti-
mate is the empirical counterpart of Eq. (16).
A.2. Computation of the market shares used to estimate Eq. (1)
Market shares si and si=g are deﬁned as:
si ¼ qtyiMKThs4;d
si=g ¼ qtyiMKThs6;d
where qtyi is the quantity (in kg) of variety i exported to market d.
MKThs4;d (MKThs6;d) is destination d’s total demand (in kg) for goods
belonging to the same HS4(HS6) product class of variety i. Because
we do not observe countries’ demand at this ﬁne level of product
disaggregation, we proxy for it with the total imports of a country











j qtyj is the total quantity exported by
French ﬁrms in a particular HS4 product class to destination d,
and
Phs6;d
j qtyj is the total quantity exported within more disaggre-
gated HS6 product classes. These terms are computed by aggregat-
ing individual French ﬁrms’ exported quantities observed in
Customs at the product-destination level. Because the numerators
express the import demand of country d from France, in order to
obtain the total import demand of a country, we divide by 1 so
that is the import share from France in that product class (while
so is the import share from all other destinations in that product
class).40 Market shares are computed for each individual year.
A.3. Summary statistics from the estimation of Eq. (1)
Table 10 summarizes the estimation results from the 1,217
regressions of Eq. (1) run on individual HS4 product categories.
We report the mean, the median, the 1st and the 3rd quartiles of
the coefﬁcients obtained in these regressions both by FE and
IVFE. FEIV corrects the expected upward bias affecting FE
coefﬁcients.
At the bottom of the table we report the percentage of observa-
tions with signiﬁcant IVFE price and elasticity coefﬁcients. These
parameters are not statistically different from zero when the equa-
tion is not precisely estimated (i.e., insufﬁcient observations). We
drop the product categories for which the parameters are insignif-
icant or outside a credible range (i.e., a^IVFE < 0 and 0 < r^IVFE < 1).
Although this cleaning shrinks the size of the sample (25% observa-
tions are dropped), it enhances the validity of the empirical strat-
egy by retaining only product categories for which we obtain a39 This proxy is based on the assumption that the imports of a country in a given
product class is proportional to its total demand for that product. Because in
regressions on quality we control for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, this approxima-
tion does not affect our ﬁnal results.
40 We compute so using the quantities of each country’s import from France and
from other origins, within each HS6 and HS4 product class, reported in the BACI
dataset (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).valid measure of quality. ElastIVFE is computed using the formula
in Berry (1994).
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